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Media corruption and issues of journalistic and institutional integrity 
in post-communist countries: the case of Bulgaria  
Introduction 
 
Scholars and economists unanimously agree that in its various forms, corruption has a 
negative impact on public good, undermines all democratic features in societies and erodes 
the stability of legitimate institutions (e.g., Caiden, 1997; Girling, 1997; Karklins, 2002; 
Miller el al., 2005; Warren, 2004; Wilkins, 2010). Corruption is commonly defined as “the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International (TI) 2009, 14) or 
“the abuse of a public position of trust for private gain” (Girling, 1997, p. vii). 
 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (Ping, 2016) and 
Corruption Risks in Europe (Mulcahy, 2012) are just two examples of publications 
that regularly draw attention to the high levels of corruption in the former communist 
countries in Eastern and Central Europe. One in three citizens from that region 
describe corruption or bribery as one of the biggest problems facing their country 
(Ping, 2016). Bulgaria, a former communist state which became part of the European 
Union in 2007, is often classified as a high corruption risk country where resources 
and opportunities for corruption are plentiful, while deterrents and efforts against 
high-level corruption remain inadequate (Mungiu-Pippidi, et al., 2011; Mungiu-
Pippidi, et al., 2013; Stoyanov et al., 2014).  
 
In normative theory the press is entrusted with the important task of informing 
and educating the public of the harm caused by corruption, not being part of it (Pope, 
2000). According to Voltmer (2013, p. 215) “corruption in the media has immense 
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implications for both journalistic professionalism and the prospects of 
democratizations.” Studies have shown that sociopolitical, historical, and contextual 
factors have significant influence on journalism practice and media corruption goes 
beyond journalists’ personal values and integrity (Yang, 2012). This paper will 
attempt to address four main questions: how does corruption manifest itself in the 
media and in journalistic practice, according to journalists in Bulgaria? What is the 
attitude of Bulgarian journalists towards media corruption and existing ethical codes 
of practice? Is the Bulgarian post-communist media capable of fulfilling its normative 
role as a check to corruption and as watchdog for society, according to journalists? 
Finally, what are the main factors that can explain the existence of corruption among 
individual journalists and whole media outlets?   
 
The paper is based on semi-structured interviews with thirty-five journalists 
from a range of national and regional media outlets in Bulgaria. The interviews were 
conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2016 thus providing a valuable insiders’ perspective to 
the issue of media corruption. It starts by providing some brief context on the 
Bulgarian post-communist political, economic and media system, followed by a more 
detailed review of existing theory and studies on media corruption in emerging 
democracies, such as Bulgaria. The aim is to contribute to academic research 
concerned with the phenomenon of media corruption in transitional societies that 
continue to struggle with democratization. A better understanding of the nature of 
media corruption in Bulgaria can also aid the European Union in fine-tuning its 
efforts in supporting media freedom in Bulgaria and assist the press in strengthening 
the current system of ethical self-regulation. 
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Corruption in Bulgarian society and the media system 
 
Explaining the environment in which Bulgarian journalists live and work is important in 
order to contextualise their views. The scale of corruption in Bulgaria is formidable. For 
example, in 2014 Bulgarian citizens admitted to being involved in approximately 158 
thousand corruption transactions per month  (Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 
2014). Of those aged 18 and over 29.3% have participated in corruption transactions at 
least once (CSD 2016) while 41% believe that most MPs are corrupt and the government is 
not doing enough to fight corruption (Ping, 2016). Bulgarians have gradually grown 
intolerant of corrupt behavior since the late 1990s but they are still willing to participate in 
corruption when they need access to administrative services.  Dishonest officials act as 
gatekeepers of public services that citizens are legally entitled to and provide them in 
exchange for bribes while public positions are used mostly for self-enrichment and 
personal profiteering (Antonov, 2013). The literature points to a widespread cynical belief 
held by a significant number of people in Eastern Europe, mostly due to the harsh realities 
of life: corruption is a necessary or even ordinary evil that helps you solve personal 
problems (e.g., Karklins, 2002; Tabakova, 2000; Warren, 2004). In Bulgaria power is 
concentrated in the hands of few political party leaders and large business conglomerates, 
“interlinked in a complex web of dependencies with former secret service and communist 
party elites, which still have privileged access to state resources” (Stoyanov, et al., 2014, p. 
2). How does this affect the media? 
 
Post-communist countries are shown to have higher levels of media corruption 
than countries with advanced democracies and well-developed journalism traditions 
(Yang, 2012). Like many others in the Balkans and South East Europe, the Bulgarian 
media system is characterized by a strong degree of political parallelism (Hallin and 
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Mancini, 2012). Bulgaria is classified in the Politicized Media Model, characterized 
by “politicization of the media, lack of transparency and the connection between 
political, business and media elites” (Dobek-Ostowska, 2015, p. 31). Hidden media 
ownership exemplifies the relationship between politics and business well. A prime 
example is Corporate Commercial Bank (CCB) and its largest shareholder Tsvetan 
Vassilev who assisted the notorious politician Delyan Peevski, to become “one of 
Bulgaria’s most powerful media barons, with enough presence to manipulate public 
opinion” (Antonov, 2013, p. 73; see also Smilova and Smilov, 2015). Media outlets 
are used to appease or blackmail politicians, switching alliances instantly “should the 
government in power change or not deliver on securing business for the media 
owners” (Stoyanov et al 2014, p. 35). Bulgarian oligarchic groups such as Peevski’s 
have reached an unprecedented level of direct political influence (CSD, 2016). 
 
Successive governments have been more than reluctant to cede control over 
the public broadcast media, turning it once again into a valuable tool to gain political 
power and pursue political agendas (Broun, 2007). Perceived autonomy or freedom is 
one of the most basic working conditions for independent journalism (Weaver, 2015) 
and the Bulgarian media lack such freedom. There are several mechanisms of 
government control and censorship but one prominent example is the use of EU 
grants to buy media comfort (Stoyanov et al., 2014; CSD, 2016). The practice is 
described as a “selective subsidizing and legal bribery” (Antonov 2013, p. 95). For 
instance, EU funding earmarked for information campaigns is directed by the 
government to selected privileged media outlets. In essence those media receive state 
advertising in exchange for providing pro-government coverage (Antonov, 2013).  
Due to a sharp decline in advertising revenues since the 2008-2009 financial crisis, 
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most of the Bulgarian private media have become fully dependent on state advertising 
and PR contracts with government agencies, which severely curbs their independence 
(International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), 2014); CSD, 2016). By all 
accounts post-communist Bulgaria is plagued by corruption across a range of 
fundamental social institutions, such as government, judiciary, business and including 
the media.  
What is media corruption?  
There is no clear differentiation in the literature between the concepts of media 
corruption and cash for news coverage (Li, 2013). Scholars include a wide variety of 
practices under the umbrella term “media opacity”, which includes “any form of 
payment for news coverage or any influence on editors and journalists’ decisions that 
is not clearly stated in the finished journalistic product” (Kruckeburg and Tsetsura 
2017, p. 34). Case studies that focus on corruption in media and journalism in 
different countries are extremely popular among researchers (e.g. Tsetsura, 2003; 
Tsetsura, 2015; Lo et al., 2005; Li, 2013; Onyebadi and Alajmi, 2014). According to 
Mancini et al. (2016) there are numerous ways corruption manifests itself in 
journalism and media. For example, a journalist might demand a bribe to keep a 
corruption scandal quiet. Journalists can also be part of wider corrupt networks that 
support and encourage corruptive behaviours and editors may accept payments from 
political actors before or during election periods or effectively ban criticism of major 
advertisers (Mancini et al., 2016). Media corruption normally involves direct or 
indirect payments and benefits (financial or other) for covering (or not covering) 
certain news and intentionally misleading audiences on behalf of the briber (Yang, 
2012). The phenomenon is categorised further in the literature by the nature of the 
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behaviour and the scale: for example, individual envelope taking and institutional 
profit seeking (Li, 2013). The practice of envelope journalism, normally attributed to 
“a few bad apples” (Miller et al., 2005, p. 102) is generally regarded as relatively 
unimportant in comparison to institutional/organisational large-scale corruption where 
the institution itself engages in repeated/habitual corrupt acts (Ristow, 2010). There 
are no detailed case studies on media corruption in Bulgaria but scholars have noted 
instances of both individual corruption among journalists and institutional rent-
seeking behaviour (Blagov et al., 2014; CSD, 2016). This paper will examine how 
media corruption manifests itself on individual and institutional level by examining 
the following categories that are most common in studies of media corruption in 
emerging democracies: direct payments (e.g. cash for news coverage, gifts/freebies) 
and indirect (e.g. hidden advertising/advertorials, smear campaigns).  
Direct payments – cash for news coverage, gifts/freebies 
 
Direct payments involve cash paid specifically for content to appear in the media. The 
phenomenon is also described in the literature as “envelope journalism” (Voltmer, 
2013, p. 208),  “cash for comment” and “payola” in the United States (Miller et al., 
2005, p. 52), “embute and chayote” in Mexico (Márquez Ramírez, 2014, p. 55); “soli” 
in Ghana, “gombo” in Cameroon (Skjerdal, 2010, p. 368), “zakazukha” in Russia 
(Kruckebergh and Tsetsura, 2017, p. 32), “jeansa” in Ukraine (Ristow, 2010, p. 9) and 
“red envelope” in China (Li, 2013, p. 300). On an individual level “envelope 
journalism” refers to the way the cash is handed to journalists in exchange for 
favourable or unfavourable news coverage, an event that is particularly widespread in 
transitional societies and an accepted part of source-journalist relationships (Voltmer, 
2013). It is important to consider the institutions, or those who offer cash for news, 
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the context that allows the problem to flourish, and the inadequate media ethics 
training received by journalists (Onyebadi and Alajmi, 2014). Overall, cash for news 
coverage involves journalists purposefully producing biased or misleading content in 
exchange for benefits, which can affect the credibility of media, hamper the flow of 
information and interfere with the public’s right to know (Yang, 2012). 
Most journalists in the world today experience the modern and seemingly 
more benign version of bribery: the freebie (Keeble, 2008). This includes free trips, 
meals, small or large gifts, hotels, discounts, tickets, entertainment and junkets 
(Caiden, 1988; Sanders, 2003). In the literature often the blame for gift-acceptance is 
placed on the shoulders of individual journalist. The practice is explained, and 
sometimes defended, either by poverty, poor pay and financial insecurity of 
journalists (Li, 2013; Lo et al., 2005; Skjerdal, 2010) or by immorality, immature 
understanding of the role of the press in emerging democracies and cultural tolerance 
(Kruckerberg and Tsetsura, 2017). Freebies tend to be frowned upon in many 
countries in Europe and North America but in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, for 
example, the receipt of small gifts, trips and meals is perceived by the majority of 
journalists as acceptable (Lo et al., 2005; Li, 2013). In Kuwait, receiving and even 
asking for gratification, has become common practice in journalism, not because of 
poverty but as a result of poor ethics training, hiring part-time unqualified reporters 
and negligent attitude from media owners towards ethical guidelines (Onyebadi and 
Alajmi, 2014).  
Indirect payments – hidden advertising/advertorials, smear campaigns 
 
Indirect payments and influences are somewhat more complex than handing cash. 
There is a strong argument in the literature that those who accept and produce hidden 
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advertising are complicit in deceiving and manipulating their audiences and eroding 
the public’s trust in media and journalism (Kruckerberg and Tsetsura, 2017; Miller et 
al., 2005; Ristow, 2010).  Others argue that the diminishing borders between 
advertising and editorial content is dangerous for independent media content and a 
product of intricate mix of economic and ideological factors, which work behind the 
scenes (Harro-Loit and Saks, 2006). Advertorials and paid journalism form a 
significant part of media corruption in transitional societies where they are often used 
to further the interests of a hidden sponsor (Voltmer, 2013). A variation of paid 
journalism in Eastern Europe, and particularly Russia, is the so-called “black” and 
“white” public relations (PR). “Black” relates to illegal or unethical PR practices, 
including the formation of a negative opinion about someone or something, 
manipulative election campaigning and a wide range of informal practices that 
involve illegal payments to journalists and media outlets (Ledeneva, 2006). “White” 
PR on the other hand, is regarded as the opposite of “black” PR: an ethical and 
accountable public relations practice that achieves its goals in a legal and transparent 
manner.  To complicate matters further, there is also “grey PR”, which exploits legal 
loopholes or manipulates the law in order to influence elections through media 
coverage, for example (Ledeneva, 2006).  
 
Smear campaigns are also classified as media corruption in studies because 
they are deliberate, “insincere pronouncements and the spreading of falsehoods in 
order to destroy reputations” (Miller et al., 2005, p. 10; see also Oates, 2013). In 
Eastern Europe they are known as kompromat, the Russian abbreviation for 
compromising materials that essentially means mud-slinging by journalists against 
political or business figures without giving the accused the chance to reply (Oates, 
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2013). They are often well-timed, in order to inflict most damage to the reputation of 
the person involved, resort to fabrications, innuendo, publishing rumours and 
deliberate spread of misinformation (Voltmer, 2013; Karklins, 2016).  
 
The presence of the practices described so far raises two fundamental 
questions that have been a subject to longstanding debate among scholars and relate to 
the role of the media and journalism in society. Firstly, does habitual participation in 
acts that have been described as corrupt and as bribery affect individual journalists’ 
ability to be critical, impartial and objective? The literature holds different views on 
this matter. Many journalists believe that their professional judgement is not affected 
by payments or gifts (Skjerdal, 2010; Voltmer, 2013). Others see the influence of 
freebies on content as harmless most for the time but in some cases as failing the 
public due to a relaxed editorial scrutiny (Wilson, 2006). With regard to “envelope 
journalism” there is a strong agreement that its effects on media and journalism and 
society are overwhelmingly negative and far-reaching for journalism and society 
(Karklins, 2002; Ristow, 2010, Voltmer, 2013).  
 
Secondly, does the presence of corruption in the media undermine the idea of 
the press as the Fourth Estate and watchdog for society? Most authors contend that 
the media can play a crucial role in the exposure and curbing of corruption (e.g., 
Karklins, 2002; Miller et al., 2005; Pope, 2000; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Lambsdorff, 
2007). This view suggests that the media’s duty is to serve the public by holding the 
powerful to account and informing citizens, honestly and accurately, of any abuses of 
power that affect them. The press can also act to promote the idea of common good 
that may deter the adoption of corruptive behaviours (Mancini et al., 2016). Free and 
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independent media are seen as essential to preventing and keeping a check on 
corruption (Stapenhurst, 2000; Brunetti and Weider, 2002; Freille et al., 2007; Camaj, 
2013). However, in the post-communist context limited research has shown that while 
the media can act as an anti-corruption instrument those instances are rare (e.g., 
Mancini et al., 2016; Hiebert, 1999; Tabakova, 2000). Most of the time media 
coverage of corruption is guided by a logic of instrumentalization, which means that 
reporting is affected by vested and partisan interests (Mancini et al., 2017). In other 
words, corruption is covered by the press when it “allows the media to pursue specific 
goals that often favor private interests over general interest and that polarize 
opinions.” (Mancini et al., 2017, p. 84).  
 
Both bribery and instumentalization of the media by private and state interests 
is problematic for journalism. Journalists’ perceptions of their roles and the norms 
that they follow correspond to the dominant values and belief systems of a particular 
society and its political and economic context (e.g., Hallin and Mancini, 2004; 
Weaver, 1998; Voltmer, 2013; Hanitszch et al., 2016). As Mancini (2000) has pointed 
out, journalism does not develop in a vacuum. For example, in a culture where taking 
cash payments is an acceptable norm, journalists might not be immune to behavior 
which contradicts ethical guidelines (Onyebadi and Alajmi, 2014). Evidence from 
scores of countries shows that Codes of Ethics and ideas of good journalistic practice 
can either be ignored or misused (Harro-Loit and Saks, 2006; Lo et al., 2005). It has 
been noted that the self-regulatory mechanisms of the Bulgarian press are very weak 
and fail to address practices such as selling content to the highest bidder (Smilova et 
al., 2012)
i
. Therefore, it is important to explore journalists’ perceptions of unethical 
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and corrupt practices in the Bulgarian post-communist media that are said to severely 
challenge the role of the media as a watchdog for society.   
 
Methods and design of the study 
 
This paper is based on analysis of face-to-face in-depth interviews with a cohort of 
Bulgarian journalists. Anonymous semi-structured interviews with 35 journalists based in 
the capital city Sofia and in three major regional cities (Plovdiv, Varna and Vratsa) were 
employed as the method of collecting data. One-to-one discussion was deemed as the most 
appropriate method for collecting rich data as those who have lived under former 
communist regimes are “more accustomed to guarded speech and will speak openly only to 
selective individuals” (Braun, 2007, p. 205). The researcher followed an interview 
schedule but allowed participants to discuss other areas of concern. Of the interviewees, 29 
were practicing journalists before the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 and 
continued their careers in the media without interruption, in positions ranging from junior 
reporters to editors-in-chief and senior TV/radio producers and directors.
ii
 Six participants 
began working as journalists with the start of democratization in the early 1990s. 
 
Participants were identified and recruited by the researcher, who is a former Bulgarian 
journalist, through purposive and snowball sampling to include journalists from different 
types of media: electronic, print and online. The common denominator for selecting 
participants was substantial first-hand journalism experience of the changes in the post-
communist media landscape. The sample included: 12 broadcast journalists from all major 
public and private broadcasters; 13 from all main national print media in the capital, Sofia, 
and three from major regional cities; two from online media; and five freelance journalists 
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who have worked across a number of print and broadcast media. Most of the interviews 
(27) were conducted in 2010 after a pilot of four interviews took place in 2009, and an 
additional four interviews were conducted in 2016. The reason for conducting the 
additional interviews was to explore the situation in regional media, which was not 
addressed sufficiently in previous interviews. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in 
the capital city Sofia, where all participants from national media were based. During the 
interviews the majority of interviewees indicated that regional media functions in a slightly 
different environment with some unique characteristics, which prompted the researcher to 
speak to four regional journalists in 2016 and investigate further. Gaining access to 
participants and ensuring a high degree of trust between interviewer and interviewees was 
relatively straightforward for the researcher due to their background as a journalist. 
However, the researcher was fully aware that the content of the interview could have been 
affected by their identity and experience as a former journalist and took steps to ensure that 
personal experience, existing judgments and values did not affect the discussion. Field 
notes and observations were made after each interview. On the positive side the 
researcher’s own expert knowledge and familiarity with the Bulgarian media landscape 
helped to validate the claims and information provided by the interviewees. Anonymity of 
the journalists was guaranteed before the start of each interview, thus allowing them to 
discuss freely, and without any fear of being identified, sensitive topics such as corruption, 
bribery, blackmail and collusion. The study obtained ethical approval and interviewees 
quoted in this paper are identified by position and type of media in order to avoid any 
potential risks of the participants being identified, and their careers jeopardized.  
 
The interview schedule consisted of 22 questions drawn from themes from the 
literature that indicated the emergence and establishment of certain trends in post-
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communist media systems since 1989, and specifically in the Bulgarian media system. 
The questions aimed to explore how journalists view and understand the changes 
taking place in the post-communist media. While the focus of this paper is on media 
corruption, the discussion extends to other problems such as professional ethics, 
media ownership constraints, political and corporate interference, and financial 
dependency that are closely related to the problem of media corruption. As scholars 
have argued, any analysis of media corruption should consider a range of corrupt acts 
not only on the individual but also at the organisational and even societal level 
(Gronbeck, 1989; Yang, 2012).  The discussion of corruption also requires context, 
nuance, and multiple points of view to be scrutinised (Wilkins, 2010). As a source of 
triangulation and validation, the researcher conducted interviews with five well-
known Bulgarian experts who have observed and researched the Bulgarian media 
landscape for many years
iii
.  
 
On the one hand, corruption (individual and institutional) is a controversial and sensitive 
topic, and as Voltmer (2013, p. 209) notes, its exploration requires sensitivity, allowing the 
respondents to “save face” when sharing their experiences. On the other hand, strong 
personal beliefs do not necessarily equate to true or accurate beliefs so the possibility that 
the individual has reached the wrong conclusion must also be taken into account (Miller S. 
et al., 2005). The researcher was aware of this and took care to verify and fact-check 
claims made by interviewees by using variety of primary sources such as news papers and 
reports.  
Findings  
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All participants acknowledge the existence of a wide variety of corrupt acts in 
the Bulgarian media sphere that have evolved since the process of democratization 
began more than twenty-five years ago. Most of the interviewees describe the 
phenomenon of media corruption broadly as a set of immoral or unethical practices 
that constitute violation of professional, moral, ethical and institutional journalistic 
norms. Journalists clearly distinguish between individual and organisational types of 
media corruption. The most problematic types of corruption in everyday practice that 
were identified by the participants are summarized in Table 1 and will be discussed in 
more detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
Individual corruption Institutional/organisational 
Engaging in so-called “black” Public 
Relations (PR) (21) 
 
Accepting state advertising and private 
sponsorship in exchange for withholding 
criticism. (35) 
Arranging paid interviews/guest 
appearances (11) 
Publishing hidden advertising (21) 
Writing paid-for articles – news items, 
interviews and special features (24) 
Blacklisting/avoiding certain topics (23) 
 
Accepting cash-in-hand, gifts and other 
perks such as trips and associated 
expenses (35) 
Conducting systematic and orchestrated 
smear campaigns on behalf of hidden 
sponsors (11) 
Exchanging personal favours with 
sources (28) 
Blackmailing political and business 
actors (5) 
Table 1: Types of corruption. (The numbers in brackets indicates the number of 
participants who mentioned the issue.)  
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 Individual corruption – small scale bribery 
 
The interviewees generally distinguish between two common types of “hidden 
PR”: “black” (negative and unfavourable coverage) and “white” (getting 
positive/favourable coverage). The latter is viewed mostly as ethical, but only if it 
transparent in its paid placement and distinguishable from editorial content.  For some 
of the interviewees “black” PR is a broad term that includes a number of informal 
corrupt activities that have an impact on the professional relationship between 
journalists and their sources, for example politicians. Politicians are said to use PR 
agencies as a front to pay journalists without handing them cash directly. In other 
words, they use a mediator to pass the envelope, coining the term “hidden PR”. Some 
PR agencies contact certain journalists on their books, to offer them guest 
appearances from senior political figures. In exchange the journalist receives cash as 
well as the benefit of high viewing figures. To the audience it may seem like a 
legitimate appearance but behind the surface it is not, as this quote shows:   
All they have to do is agree on the interview and what will be said. All agreed 
and paid for but the audience does not have a clue about this. (Senior TV 
producer, private TV channel).  
In other examples PR agencies can have an official contract with a media 
outlet to publish a series of news articles that are not identified as paid-for.  
Politicians and corporate actors can pay individual journalists for positive features in 
the press or to publish “made to order” (custom) interviews. Those, according to 
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interviewees are distinguishable by the following characteristics: presenting someone 
only in positive light; not asking any inconvenient questions; avoiding or glossing 
over controversial issues; and interviewing people outside a journalist’s usual beat. 
This quote illustrates the practice of envelope journalism that ensures favourable 
coverage on regional level:  
With certainty I can tell you what happens in our city. Journalists get paid cash 
in hand to conduct interviews, to invite certain people in their programmes and 
to ask them pre-approved questions. This goes on outside the official contract 
and agreements […] sometimes it is cheaper to buy journalists than to pay whole 
media outlets. (Senior regional correspondent) 
According to some interviewees, the most corrupt journalists are those who enjoy 
expensive cars, watches, clothes and lavish lifestyle, which is in stark contrast of the low 
slaries of most media workers. Election periods are noted as specifically rife for media 
corruption. Many participants describe elections as gold mines and an opportunity to make 
money for cash strapped journalists.  This quote summarizes the practice: 
[Politicians] go around with suitcases full of cash to pay people on different 
levels – from the reporter, the journalist, to their boss. In most cases they get 
paid in cash. […] When elections are close the whole media environment gets 
excited because they know what is coming to them. (Former editor-in-chief of 
national daily newspaper and current freelance journalist) 
However, as well as on individual level this also happens on institutional level. Whole 
media outlets can benefit financially from elections if they choose to, as this Editor 
points out: 
We have had people come to us and offer us money so that we don’t write 
anything negative against them during election periods. That has happened often 
with political actors who are worried, and have a reason to avoid media 
coverage, to insure themselves against any potential criticism. We are fortunate 
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to be able to refuse such offers but I doubt others do (Editor-in-chief, regional 
online news media) 
While none of the interviewees admitted to accepting envelopes with cash, some stated that 
they and their colleagues have accepted small gifts such as food and drinks, free flights, 
and hotels. An interesting example is provided by an editor who distinguishes between 
different types of gifts: some are “committing” and others “harmless”:  
Yes, it [the freebie] has always been there but media have different rules and 
judgements. Some of them are willing and able to accept any kind of gifts. Very 
often it is electronics or payment of trips with the expectation to write certain 
stories afterward. Our journalists are not allowed to accept anything if a 
company or institution presents them with an expensive gift. They must return it, 
or refuse. At Christmas we receive whole series of advertising materials – 
notebooks, calendars, sometimes wine and chocolates.  Those type of things are 
acceptable, but the others are not.” (Editor-in-chief, daily national newspaper) 
In common with professionals from other countries, Bulgarian journalists 
largely do not believe this to be hugely problematic and believe that accepting small 
and insignificant gifts has little effect on their professional judgement or the content 
they write. However, the dominant culture of favour exchange is seen as problematic. 
For example, many political, corporate and public figures are close friends with 
reporters and instead of cash or gifts they may exchange favours, as this interviewee 
explains: 
For example, a friend might ask for a favour. I’ve done it too. It’s like trade – 
they say “can you write about this thing and in exchange we’ll do this for you, or 
give you something else” for the paper, for example or just a quote when I need 
one. This happens, we are people and those are the circles we move around in. I 
mean you’re not committing a crime, you’re not writing a bad story about that 
person, and you’re not hiding some big truths. But sadly, you have to live with 
the fact that you’ve written this insignificant story about someone and that puts 
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professional and emotional pressure on you.  (Editor-in-chief, online news 
media) 
Institutional/Organisational Corruption 
 
The participants believe state advertising is the key to understanding the issue 
of institutional media corruption.  Receiving such advertising enables the media to 
exist but essentially ties its hands and silences any criticism of those who provide the 
advertising. According to many interviewees, the practice has become endemic since 
Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 because the money often comes from state funds 
earmarked for publicity from EU projects. The following quote summarize well how 
the practice works on a national level: 
The state gives you money officially, say one hundred thousand for advertising. 
This helps you to sort out your budget and to exist. You return the favour by 
being accommodating, you don’t probe further, you don’t investigate so there is 
an effect on content. […] As an advertiser, the state buys comfort. This is a type 
of financing and not a direct cash exchange […] There is a steady maintenance, 
even with what looks like small sums of money – five thousands for one 
newspaper, five thousand for another, but on a regional level those are resources 
that help you survive. (Editor-in-chief, national daily newspaper) 
And on a regional level: 
It is all done for very small sums of money, for which colleagues are ready to 
serve the local authorities without questioning them and without any criticism. 
This turns local municipalities into a destructive institution when you say 
something as it is or when they don’t like what you have written. We have 
serious conflicts with the local administration simply for trying to do our jobs 
properly and expose abuses of power. (Editor-in-chief, regional online media)  
The main reasons given by participants for the media’s willingness to accept 
payments/financing from the state include: the dire state of media budgets, especially 
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those of small regional outlets; big drop in paper circulations; fierce competition with 
online media; and a small advertising market in Bulgaria that is shrinking even 
further. Two regional editors noted that if local media dare to expose corruption in 
their municipalities this has a severe impact on their financing. For example, those 
who investigate are cut off from access to local state advertising, which is a major 
source for their funding. On some occasions private advertisers are warned by local 
authorities not to place adverts in critical newspapers as in this example: 
We have always been critical of the local authority and they have a grudge 
against us. One week I had several of our regular advertisers call me to say they 
will not be renewing their official contracts and will not be placing advertising in 
our paper.  This was despite us having worked together for years. When I 
pleaded with them, they said they could help us but with unofficial payments so 
no one knows. I had to refuse these offers, move to smaller premises and let 
some staff go. (Editor-in-chief, regional media) 
The dominant perception among interviewees is that official payments are bribing whole 
outlets with state advertising on a national and regional level and can be an excuse for the 
owner to ban or blacklist topics that may jeopardise the payments. However, a few 
interviewees noted that if money is not forthcoming, some media have resorted to 
blackmailing and threatening local authorities or businesses with unfair negative coverage, 
for example. It must be highlighted that while political and corporate agendas are blamed 
for endorsing corruption, several journalists reflect on the fact that they might be partly 
responsible for the existing environment, as this journalist pointed out:  
There were periods when all of us made sure to make a new government 
comfortable and avoid big horrible stories about improper privatisation, for 
example. If we had started looking into this earlier and not waited years [...] then 
we might have prevented some of it. But at that time it was very comfortable to 
be quiet, receive some kind of privileges from the government and so on.  
(Editor-in-chief, online news media) 
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As for the 2004 ethics codes that some media have voluntarily signed up to, there is still 
high doubt among most participants about the applicability of the rules. This is mostly due 
to the fact that a large number of media outlets refused to accept it and adopted their own 
in 2013. However, most interviewees render both nice on paper but meaningless in 
practice. Nevertheless, some stated that the codes are a small and important step toward 
achieving a working mechanism for self-regulation of the press.  
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The notion of a corrupt media outlet, owner, editor or reporter exists relative 
to the established notion of what uncorrupt media and journalists are believed to be – 
namely truth-seekers, whose job it is scrutinise, expose abuses of power and hold 
those in power to account. This is certainly an ideal role that many journalists from 
Eastern Europe and Bulgaria were encouraged to adopt as soon as communism 
collapsed. However, the views of journalists presented in this paper indicate that 
harsh economic reality, financial dependency and careless attitude towards ethical 
guidelines prevent the Bulgarian media from acting as an independent check on 
corruption. As scholars have noted, media organisations in fragile democracies 
without self-sustaining financial mechanisms are a soft target for regimes that can 
manipulate them for selfish agendas (Carrington and Nelson, 2002). The practice of 
using state advertising as a bargaining chip for favourable coverage has deprived 
national and local media of their critical voice.  Both literature and findings clearly 
demonstrate that corruption in Bulgaria is widespread and this is seriously affecting 
the way media and journalists work. The corrupt environment can be traced back to 
the top of the political, corporate and media pyramid. The findings corroborate 
previous research on post-communist countries where “intricate web of connection 
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and interaction between elites and news media makes the elites’ control or influence 
over news coverage for political or economic purposes relatively difficult to resist on 
the part of journalism practitioners” (Yang, 2012, p. 206). The analysis of Bulgarian 
journalists’ views points to a muzzled post-communist media that is very vulnerable 
financially and a soft target by political and corporate forces determined to control the 
public agenda. The majority of journalists and outlets are forced to focus mostly on 
economic survival and are coerced to sell content in exchange for much needed 
income. 
 
Corrupt practices appear to penetrate all levels of the journalist hierarchy – 
from junior reporters to editors-in chief and owners – posing further threats to 
already-low ethical and professional journalistic integrity and ethics. While media 
corruption, including the offering of payments and exchange of favours, is perceived 
by the interviewees as a very negative practices, individual corrupt acts are noted as 
hard to prove with tangible evidence. However, the allegations from most 
interviewees that they know of journalists who have taken money is troubling, partly 
because cases of alleged envelope journalism are never investigated by the authorities 
and rarely probed by journalists themselves. Existing ethical codes do nothing to 
discourage or prevent corruption in the media or to promote ethical behavior. For 
most participants, it is clear that when the media become complicit in corruption, 
there is little possibility for them to act as a check to those in power and scrutinize 
their actions. The main factors that seem to explain media corruption in Bulgaria can 
be summarized as follows: the prevalence of society-wide systemic corruption; a 
political and journalistic culture that is tolerant of corruption; close inter-elite 
relationships that involve media owners, editors and journalists; media’s strong 
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dependence on state advertising and private sponsorship; lack of solidarity and 
agreements between media with regard to ethical codes and norms; and the low pay of 
journalists in Bulgaria. The findings corroborate the claim that media corruption is 
caused by complex political, economic and cultural factors that go far beyond 
journalistic morals and integrity (Yang, 2012). 
 
While this research is limited because it’s based on the views of a small cohort of 
Bulgarian journalists, interviews with Bulgarian media experts validated those perceptions.  
Unless systemic corruption and the environment in which media operate is targeted with 
adequate anti-corruption measures, there will be little opportunity for the press to act as 
watchdog and expose corruption.  A huge variety of activity is perceived as media 
corruption and the ways of dealing with it are correspondingly diverse: there is no “magic 
bullet” solution to problems that were discussed in this paper. Efforts to combat corruption 
in society have lost momentum, but Bulgaria still needs urgent institutional anti-corruption 
measures that put media and journalists at the heart of this battle. Further cross-national 
research is also needed to investigate the complex relationship between politics, business 
and media in all post-communist societies in order to aid their democratization.  
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i
     In Bulgaria, no fewer than nine versions of a code of ethics for media and journalists have 
been created since 1990 but no mechanisms or incentives exist to make the current two that 
are in operation work. Recent media wars in Bulgaria resulted in a split within the 
publishers’ union resulting in a refusal of a large number of media outlets to sign the 
voluntary ethics code that was adopted in 2004 with help from EU experts (Smilova and 
Smilov 2015). As Bossev and Cheresheva (2015, 20) state, the country’s press and online 
media are regulated by two ethical committees, each adopting their own code. The first is 
only recognised by a small part of the media while the other, which includes 80% cent of 
publications, “is practically inactive”.  
ii
 Positions of journalists: Senior (Editor/Deputy Editor/Director): 18; Middle (Senior 
Reporter/Columnist/Presenter/Correspondent): 11; Junior (Reporter): 1; Freelance: 5. 
iii
 The names and positions of the experts at the time of the interviews were : Georgi Lozanov – 
Chairman, Council for Electronic Media (CEM); Orlin Spassov – Executive Director, 
Foundation Media and Democracy; Ognian Zlatev – Managing Director, Media 
Development Center; Lilia Raycheva – Lecturer at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" 
and member of Council of Electronic Media; Nikoleta Daskalova – Research Analyst, 
Foundation Media and Democracy. 
